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1. Introduction Modern conflicts are seldom national. Conflicts have during the post‐modern era transformed beyond the nation‐state into an intra‐state venue. The nation‐state is  not  necessarily  the major  actor  in  political  violence  and  the  interests  of  the nation  state  are  no  longer  the  main  reasons  for  hostilities.  Some  researchers have  emphasized  that  decentralized  actors  and  conflicts  characterize  modern conflict  even  though  the  centralized  nation‐state  still  is  the  basis  of  political interaction  on  the  global  arena.  Refugee  flows,  economic  destabilization  and parties  of  conflict  are  now  cross‐border  phenomenon  and  the  nation‐state’s traditional monopoly of legitimate violence has in some regions become diluted if not extinct (Kaldor 1999).  The  cross‐border  characteristics  of  today’s  conflicts  may  threaten  to destabilize the political, economical and humanitarian situation of entire regions. An  instability  that  in  addition  may,  directly  or  indirectly,  spill  over  to neighbouring  regions.  To  cope  with  the  change  in  nature  of  conflicts  the international  community  has  intervened  in  several  countries  and  regions.  The internationalization of internal or regional conflict can thus be viewed, in part, as a  product  of  the  increasing  willingness  by  the  international  community  to intervene.  The  EU  is,  as  part  of  that  community,  one  of  the  world’s  major international actors. There  are  different  strategies  available  to  the  international  community,  e.g. civilian  intervention  through  economic  aid  and  observers  or  military intervention  with  peace  keeping/enforcing  operations.  This  thesis  explores whether  these  two  categories  of  interventions  come  with  different consequences. Furthermore, there exists an important political dimension to this discussion. The choice of strategy has a potential explosiveness to it. In the eyes of  the  voters  there  is  a  slim political  line between disregarding  the outcries  of help by war‐ridden societies and mindlessly sacrificing the  lives of  the nation’s young  to  another  country’s  war.  The  choice  between  civilian  aid  and military intervention  is  always  a  topic  on  the  political  agenda  of  a  country  engaged  in peace  efforts.  Given  that  modern  conflict  has  transformed  and  that  the  world community  still  is  engaged  in  peace  operations,  objective  scrutinizing  of  the 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motives for intervention and the implemented strategies is now more important than ever.  
1.1 Purpose of Study The  purpose  of  the  thesis  is  to  explore  the  role  of  EU  as  a  peacekeeper  in Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  (DRC).  More  specifically,  the  thesis  aims  at analyzing how the EU’s perception of a conflict affect the instrument used in an intervention.  Secondly,  the  thesis  investigates  the  difference  between instruments regarding the impact on a conflict.  To accomplish this I will use a case study of the EU involvement in the conflict in the DRC, where the EU has used both civilian and military strategies. Building on the theoretical framework presented in chapter two this thesis argues that in order  to  analyze  how  and with what  result  the  EU  intervened  in  the DRC  it  is essential  to problematize the perception the EU had of  the conflict  in the Great Lakes Region. By analyzing how the EU was  involved  in  the conflict  (e.g. which  institutions and nations), by what means  (e.g.  intervention  instruments)  and  the  impact of the operations  (e.g.  recipients, objectives)  the  thesis will  connect  the empirical research of the intervention in the DRC to securitization theory.  However, this thesis does not have as objective to make any normative claims regarding  peace  interventions  but  rather  to  present  a  perspective  on  the processes  behind  the  interventions  and  what  the  consequences  of  different strategies are.  





 What  was  the  product  of  the  intervention,  i.e.  the  consequences  of  the intervention? 
 Was there a difference in the contribution to the peace process between the civil and military operations? 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis After  the  introductory  chapter  the  theoretical  background  is  presented  in chapter  two.  The  first  part  a  gives  the  reader  a  review  of  the  securitization process  and  the  security  governance  international  actors  employ  in  order  to regulate conflict and respond to the modern security situation. The second part outlines the critique of Christou et al. and presents their contribution to the field of  security  studies.  The  third  part  develop  the  analytical  framework  and  the operationalization by Schulz & Söderbaum. The aim of the chapter is to give the reader a framework of reference, thus placing the thesis in a wider academic and theoretical  context  as well  as  to present  the  theoretical backbone of  the  thesis and the bridge between the theory and the empirical research.  The  third  chapter  outlines  the methodology  and  delimitations  for  the  thesis. The  fourth chapter presents  the analysis of  the conflict and  intervention  in  the DRC and  implement  the analytical  tool of  the  thesis on  the  conflict  and  the EU intervention. The first part briefly explains the process leading up to the first EU intervention; it also explains the context surrounding the conflict and the major relevant actors. The second part analyses the EU’s perception of the conflict and how the security issue has been constructed. In the third part it chronologically outlines  the  EU  peace  operations  in  the  DRC,  both  military  and  civilian  and analyses them as instruments of security governance. The fourth part evaluates the  impact  of  the  military  and  civilian  operations.  The  fifth,  and  final  chapter 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summarizes,  presents  the  conclusions  and  reconnects  the  analysis  to  the research questions. 
2. Theoretical framework As  stated  in  the  introduction  conflict  patterns  have  in  the  post‐modern  era undergone a process of transformation. This is also true for securitization theory and  theory  of  security  governance.  Moving  away  from  the  state‐centric perspective that was prevailing during the Cold War we now find ourselves in an era when security is above all a subjective phenomenon. What is, and what is not, a security matter is now in the eye of the beholder.  Considered  by  many  as  a  significant  threat  to  the  security  of  the  larger community  in  a  globalized  world,  intrastate  conflicts  are  now  increasingly viewed  as  international  conflicts.  A  local  conflict  in  Africa  might  not  directly make up a security issue to a EU. But indirectly the very same conflict might have several consequences to the EU that constitutes a threat. For example through an increased flow of immigrants trying to enter the EU, or a failed state that offers an  excellent  opportunity  for  non‐state  actors  to  use  the  territory  as  a  base  of operations  when  conducting  attacks  on  the  EU  commercial  activities  in  the vicinity  of,  or  within,  the  region.  As  a  result,  a  large  number  of  international organizations  are  now  involved  in  peacekeeping  efforts  in  intrastate  conflicts. Following  the  purpose  of  the  thesis,  this  chapter  develops  the  theoretical framework of the study. 
2.1 Securitization and Security Governance What  is  security  then?  The  traditionalist  answer  to  that  question  would  be  a state‐centric  view  that  emphasizes  military  conflict  or  “the  threat,  use  and control  of  military  force”  (Walt  1991  in  Buzan  et  al.  1998:  3).  Because  of  the obsession  with  nuclear  war  and  military  might  of  the  Cold  War  a  debate regarding  what  should  constitute  as  security  surfaced.  Environmental  and economic issues rose to the agenda and challenged the traditionalist perspective. Those  in  favour of a widening of  the definition of  security argued  for an  issue‐centred perspective that included non‐military causes of conflict. When widening the  concept  of  security  the  scope  of  security  studies  grew  immensely,  but  not 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without  complications.  How  should  the  area  of  security  studies  be  defined  if everything from trade negotiations, ozone‐holes and fishing rights could possibly form  a  cause  of  conflict  and  thus  a  security  issue?  Using  the  traditionalist definition of a security  issue: as an existential  threat  to  the referent object,  the wider  perspective  of  security  implies  that  a  threat  will  vary  across  different levels  and  sectors  to  the  same  extent  as  existence  itself.  There  is  no  universal existence and as a consequence there cannot be a universal method of defining a threat.  However,  when  the  constituents  of  the  referent  have  intersubjectively interpreted an issue as a threat its special nature justifies the extraordinary use of force to handle it  (Buzan et al. 1998: 21‐22). The discursive transformation of an issue from the realm of politics to the realm of security – a securitizing move – is completed when the audience accepts the new position of the issue. When the process is completed an actor normally will have the legitimate right to break the normal rules of how to handle a problem, at  least  in the eyes of the public that has accepted the securitization. In extreme cases lethal violence is accepted as a coercive action intended to change the attitude or intent of an adversary (Buzan et  al 1998: 26‐26). The  securitization processes  therefore has a dual objective. Firstly  it  is  aimed  at  the  transformation  of  an  issue,  secondly  it  serves  the purpose  of  legitimizing whatever means  are  that  are  deemed  adequate  to  the perceived threat.   The  fundamental  problem  with  international  politics  is  how  to  manage  the constant  securitization  by  the  world’s  actors  –  how  to  provide  “regulation  of conflict without the resort to war” (Sperling 2009: 4, 6). Security governance is, in  the  eyes  of  James  A.  Sperling,  the  theory  that  serves  nations  in  order  to manage  “the  different  patterns  of  interstate  interaction,  the  rising  number  of non‐state  security  actors,  the  expansion  of  the  security  agenda  and  conflict resolution and regulation”. Sperling argues that nations in the post‐Westphalian era,  which  has  diluted  the  state‐centric  monopoly  on  defence  of  the  national territory  as  well  as  the  very  need  of  defence  of  the  national  territory,  have subcontracted  many  of  the  tasks  that  traditionally  were  the  responsibility  of nation‐states to supra‐ or international institutions (ibid: 5). 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In a European context Webber et al. (2004) defines security governance as “the coordinated  management  and  regulation  of  issues  by  multiple  and  separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the  issue),  formal  and  informal  arrangements,  in  turn  structured  by  discourse and  norms,  and  purposefully  directed  toward  particular  policy  outcomes” (Webber et al. 2004: 4).  Not only has the traditional security referent, e.g. the state, and how the state act in respect to current security issues changed. So have the agents of threat and actual threats. As we have seen, threats from a traditionalistic perspective were targeting  the  existence,  or  functioning,  of  the  state.  From  the  widened perspective  a  broad  spectra  of  issues  have  been  added  to  the  list  of  possible securitization. Characteristically,  threats now aim at  targets  “above and below” the  state.  Even  though  the  state  still  exists  as  a  possible  target  of  threat  the military and economic capacity of the developed world together with economic interdependence among  them make conventional warfare an unlikely scenario. With a state as the agent of threat the targets of threat may more likely vary from economic  or  technical  infrastructure  to  the macroeconomic  stability. However, the  emergence  of  failed  states  and  powerful  non‐state  actors  poses  a  parallel track  to  the  normal  security  issues.  These  new  threats  range  from  terrorism targeting  the  state  to  migratory  flows,  trafficking,  drug  smuggling,  arms smuggling,  piracy  and  environmental  disasters  targeting  or  threatening  the national  society  or  regional  situation  (Sperling  2009:  6).  Accordingly,  all  the elements  of  the  governance  of  securitization  have  changed  dramatically  in  the post‐modern/post‐Westphalian era, the referents of threat,  the agents of threat and the threats themselves.  This change has created numerous examples of supranational institutions that influence  or  manage  the  modern  political,  economical  and  military  security agendas of sovereign nations; e.g. the UN, NATO, EU, AU, ASEAN and NAFTA. The political  control  of  securitization  –  security  governance  –  has  thus  made  an evolutionary  leap.  For  how  can  the  existence  of  an  institution  be  threatened when it is not tied down by the boundaries of territoriality, when its existence is based  on  conventions,  trust  and  affinity?  The  cross‐border  phenomenon  of modern  conflict  and  security  has  forced  the  security  governance  of  the 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developed world to become fully globalized, or at least fully regionalized (Buzan et al 1998: 42‐45). 
2.2  A New Approach to Security Governance In the article “EU Security Governance – Putting the ‘Security’ back in” Christou et  al.  (2010)  present  their  critique  of  the  current  security‐  and  security governance theory in relation to the EU as an actor. They find that the literature and  research,  to  a  great  extent,  focus  on  actor  and  instrument  perspectives “rather than the complexity of security and the implications varied meanings of security  have  for  our  understanding  of  the  EU  as  a  security  actor”.  Treating security as objective aspects of reality fails, in their opinion, to problematize the theoretical  aspect  of  security.  (Christou  et  al.  2009:  7‐8).  They  argue  that  a theoretical  approach  to  security  would  bring  a  deeper  understandings  of  the processes related to the subjective and intersubjective construction of security, which  in  turn  would  contribute  greatly  to  the  analysis  of  the  involved  actors, governance strategies and policy practice and outcome. One may notice  the resemblance with the earlier discussion  in respect  to  the widening  of  the  concept  of  security.  There  is  one  crucial  difference  though. Cristou et al. argues that the concept of security not only needs to be widened, i.e. opened  up  to  include  different  issues  as  security  matters.  They  contend  that security  studies  have  to  implement  constructivist  logic  in  order  to  fully comprehend  how  security  is  interpreted,  realized  and  upheld.  Constructivist logic would, in their view, incorporate discourse as the focal point of the analysis as  well  as  the  consolidating  aspect  of  socialization  processes  connected  to discourse.  The  importance  of  the  construction  of  security  relates  to  the relationship  between  “discourse,  reception,  legitimization  and  actualization  of policy” (ibid: 9‐10, 12‐13). Through the understanding of how the EU securitizes issues like regional conflict outside the EU, migration and human rights a more thorough  analysis  of  EU  security  governance  and  the  impact  of  its  actions  is achievable.  In  respect  to  peace  keeping/enforcing  operations  a  analytical methodology  that  divides  the  analysis  in  (i)  construction,  (ii)  governance  and (iii)  impact  places  the  different  stages  of  the  process  in  relation  to  the  others thus creating a complete picture of the intervention (ibid: 20‐23). 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2.3 Analytical framework  Michael  Schultz  and  Fredrik  Söderbaum  (2010)  have  operationalized  the approach by Christou et al. in order to create a framework suitable for analysing the  EU  as  a  peace  and  security  actor  in  regional  conflict.  Drawing  from securitization theory and the criticism by Christou et al., their operationalization captures the constructive phase where the referent intersubjectively interprets, or  securitizes,  an  event  or  issue  as  a  threat  or  security  issue,  the  governance phase  where  the  referent  links  an  adequate  instrument  of  response  to  its perception of the threat, and finally the actual impact the instrument has on the threat or security issue.   In  respect  to  peace  interventions,  such  as  the  EU  intervention  in  the DRC,  the operationalization  brings  us  the  possibility  to  dissect  the  complex  relationship between  the different  phases  and  gives  us  the potential  of  understanding how they relate  to each other. Figure 1 below shows  the relationship as well as  the analytical steps that will be taken in chapter four.   Fig 1. The analytical scheme  
       













interpretation  of  the  current  phase  of  a  distant  conflict.  For  instance,  it  is plausible  to assume  that an actor  committed  to  intervene  in a  conflict of  some kind will adapt the intervention to the current phase of the conflict – it’s location in  the  conflict  cycle  –  and  the  threat  that  the  conflict  implies  to  the  actor.  The placement  in  the  cycle  depends  on  the  actor’s  subjective  perception  of  the conflict. But recognizing and evaluating a conflict is not sufficient. The key issue is how a conflict that doesn’t involve the EU becomes a security question to the EU. Hence, by analysing the EU’s understanding of a conflict it will be possible to better understand the commitment to intervention and the role accepted by the intervener. 
2.3.2 Governance This dimension bridges  the EU conceptualization of  the conflict  to  the  forms of intervention and the instrument used. The crucial issue is to investigate how the EU  links  the  intervention  to  the  current  phase  of  the  conflict  and  if  the intervention  includes  the  possibility  of  adapting  to  a  transformation  of  the conflict, i.e. a short‐term perspective vs. a long‐term perspective (Christou et al. 2009: 22, Schulz & Söderbaum 2010: 4). The secondary aspect of the governance dimension is the intervention instrument. Military and civilian instruments each constitute separate sides of the intervention coin. However, the consequences of the intervention instrument might be of significant difference. If the instrument of choice does not correspond to the proposed form of intervention the mission runs  the risk of  failure and/or resulting  in unintended consequences (Schulz & Söderbaum 2010: 9). 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2.3.3 Impact The final dimension, impact, considers the consequences of the intervention and how those relate to the initial objectives. When evaluating the impact of a peace operation  there  exists,  as  Schulz  and  Söderbaum  identifies,  some  ambiguity  of how to fit the operation in the big picture (ibid: 9).  Even though any small‐scale operation  forms  a  part  of  the  broader  intervention  and  by  that  constitutes  an impact  on  the  conflict,  the  relationship  between  different  actors  and  their operations is “too complex in order to make a clear peace impact assessment of small‐scale operations”  (ibid: 9).  In  the  case of  the EU  involvement  in  the DRC however,  the  magnitude  of  the  operations  and  clear  objectives  of  the intervention makes it possible to separate the EU effort from other actors, and to evaluate  the  consequences  separately.  Consequence  evaluation  relates  to assessing  the  intended  and  unintended  consequences  of  the  intervention.  An 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intervention may,  as  previously  stated,  form  a  part  of  a  greater  joint  effort  by numerous actors. One challenge is therefore to evaluate how the EU intervention relates  to  the  wider  conflict  and  intervention  context.  Can  we  attribute observable  changes  in  the  conflict  context  to  the  EU  intervention  and  is  the impact of the intervention sustainable?  
3. Methodology and delimitations To analyze the perception the EU had of the conflict in the DRC the case will be analyzed  through  the  lens  of  recent  securitization  and  security  governance theory. Using official documents,  agreements and press  releases  the  thesis will present  a  comprehensive  conclusion  of  the  reasons  behind  an  intervention  as well  as  the  EU  interpretation  of  the  conflict  in  the  DRC  and  context  of  the surrounding region. The thesis will use a case study of the EU ESDP/CSFP1 peace operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo  to  analyze  the  relationship between operational strategies  and  conflict  evolution.  The EU has  been  involved  in  the Great  Lakes Region  with  several  military  and  civilian  operations  and  in  the  DRC  with ARTEMIS, EUFOR RD CONGO, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD CONGO. Given that the DRC has been the scene of the major peacekeeping intervention the EU has been involved in and that it has been comprised of several different operations, this makes it possible to maintain the surrounding context and actors constant, thereby  solely  analysing  the  impact  of  the  operational  strategies  and  the relationship between the phase of the conflict and the implemented intervention instrument.  Furthermore  the  three‐levelled  analytical  tool makes  it  possible  to separate  the  different  aspects  of  the  intervention,  thus  investigating  how  the preconditions of the intervention affect the actual instrument and ultimately the what impact the instrument had in the conflict zone.  In  correspondence  to  the  overarching  research  questions  the  analysis  will make  use  of  a  set  of  detailed  questions  divided  in  the  same  categories.  These                                                         1 European Security and Defence Policy has now changed into Common Security and Defence Policy. It forms a major part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The author has chosen to keep the names used at the time of the intervention. 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questions are more  specific  and will  serve as  a  guideline  in  the analysis of  the intervention.  i) Construction 






 How did the intervention relate to the wider peace‐building context?   There are two expected methodological problems related to the analysis. The first  would  be  the  separation  of  the  impact  corresponding  on  one  hand  to military and civilian operations and on the other to humanitarian aid. Especially since  these  operations  often  take  place  at  the  same  time.  Even  though  the  EU Council  separates  its  involvement  in  civilian  and military  operations  the  study still  has  to  take  in  account  the humanitarian operations/support  conducted by European Commission Humanitarian Aid Organization (ECHO). However,  in the case  of  the  DRC  the  humanitarian  aid  corresponding  to  the  European Commission was suspended between 1992 and 2002 due to the insecurity in the area  (Kobia  2002:  432,  Hoebeke  2007:  5).  With  reference  to  the  long‐term nature  of  humanitarian  aid,  dramatic  structural  or  situational  changes  in  the conflict zone due to this type of aid is, at the time of the intervention, improbable. This  makes  it  possible  for  the  thesis  to  focus  solely  on  the  military  and  civil ESDP/CFSP missions. The second is the separation of the impact from EU and UN operations in the DRC. One feasible argument for the delimitations made by the thesis is that the EU  and  the  UN  operations  were  of  similar  nature  and  bilaterally  coordinated. Both  actors  implement  military  and  civil  instruments  aimed  at  the  same 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objectives:  preventing  conflict,  enforcing  peace,  keeping  peace  and/or supporting  a  sustainable  peace  and  development  process.  Furthermore,  in  the case of the intervention in the DRC the EU was acting on a UN mandate universal for  both  EU  and  UN  forces,  which  regulated  time‐lines,  rules  of  engagement (ROE)  and  mission  objectives.  This  would  make  the  difference  between  the different efforts a matter of quantity rather than quality. However,  it should be duly noted that the military intervention of the EU had a higher military capacity, which  could  be  argued  as  a  qualitative  difference.  The meaning  of  qualitative difference  here  is  a  difference  where  the  objective  of  the  intervention  is dramatically  different.  If  that  had  been  the  case,  then  the  separation  between impacts would have been radically more difficult.  




Intervention is here defined as the sum of one actor’s effort to change behaviour (violence,  corruption,  exploitation  etc.),  attitude  (hostility,  reluctance  to negotiate  etc.)  or  conditions  (famine,  poor  living  conditions,  health  etc.)  at  the scene of conflict with the ambition to promote peace. 
Operation  is  defined  as  a  part  of  an  intervention  and  can  be  constituted  by civil or military actions with the objective to support the current intervention. 
Conflict will  not  be  restricted  to  the  concept  of  conflict  between  states  or between  politically  motivated  non‐state  actors  and  a  state.  It  includes  here ethnical,  religious  and  cultural  aspects  in  order  to  capture  the  complexity  of modern  conflicts  or  a  situation  between  two,  or  several  actors,  which  may threaten the humanitarian situation and/or stability of a region or country. 
4. Analysis This chapter has two main objectives. First, it will give a brief introduction to the history of the conflict and the situation in the DRC at the time of intervention.  Secondly, he aim  is  to provide an analysis of  the EU  intervention  in  the DRC through the methodological lens of Christou et al. and Schulz & Söderbaum. The chapter analyses the EU construction of the conflict and the securitization of the issue. Thereafter, it evaluates the EU governance of the intervention and finally it assesses the impact of the intervention. 
4.1 Empirical background – the conflict in the DRC. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once described the conflict in the DRC as “Africa’s first world war” (Dobbins et al 2008: 101).  The conflict was rooted in ethnic  and  political  conflicts  as  well  as  struggle  for  control  of  the  country’s natural  resources.  The  most  recent  conflict  began  in  1997,  when  long‐time dictator Mobuto Sese Seko was overthrown by Laurent Kabila, and lasted for five years. Kabila renamed Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The name 
  17 
Zaire had followed the Autheticity process in 1967 when all colonial names was changed to African ones with the aim of creating a common sense of nationhood in the country (Bobb 1999: 8). The  conflict  was  partly  a  result  of  the  political  turmoil  that  began  when Mobuto  in  1990,  after  French  pressure,  announced  that  the  country  would abandon the single‐party system. The opposition that had been suffocated for so long  revived  itself  and  called  for  a  national  conference  to  draft  a  new constitution. However, it was badly divided and more than 200 different groups joined  the alliance between  the  three biggest opposition parties  (ibid: 13). The subsequent period between 1990 and 1997 was characterized by civil war and political and economical chaos. In 1994, following the Hutu genocide on Tutsis in Rwanda  after  the  revolution  of  the  Tutsi‐led  Rwandese  Patriotic  Front  (RPF) more then one million refugees fled over the border into Zaire.  Growing tensions caused an offensive by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour  la Libération 
du  Congo/Zaïre  (AFDL)  led  by  Zairian  Tutsis  and  supported  by  Tutsis  in neighbouring  countries.  The  offensive  forced  a  large  part  of  the  Rwandese refugees  back  over  the  border  and  the  AFDL  succeeded  in  securing  a  part  of Zairian  territory  along  the  border.  Continuing  its  advance,  and  supported  by troops from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi the AFDL forces met little resistance from  the  Zairian  army.  On May  17,  1997  AFDL  forces  entered  the  capital  and Kabila was sworn  in as president on May 29 and Zaire became the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ibid: 18, O’Ballance 2000: 157, Ekengard 2009: 16). Upon  assuming  power  Kabila’s  alliance  with  the  neighbouring  countries became a major political problem. Since he had excluded the opposition from the government  they  accused  the  regime  of  being  a  government  of  foreigners. Meanwhile, fighting erupted between on one side Congolese militia and fighters from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, and on the other anti‐RPF forces such as the Hutu  Interahamwe  rebels.  The  Interahamwe  continued  to  use  the  DRC  as  a staging  area  for  attacks  in  Rwanda,  which  infuriated  the  RPF  government  in Kigali.  Reports  at  the  time  stated  that  Congolese  government  was  secretly rearming  the  rebels  (O’Ballance  2000:  160).  Trying  to  control  the  internal political  situation  Kabila  ordered  the  return  of  all  Rwandan  officers  in  the Congolese  army,  which  only  further  deteriorated  the  relationship  with  the 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surrounding countries. As attacks on the RPF from Congolese territory continued the  invasion  of  Rwanda  and  Uganda  soon was  a  fact  (Bobb  1999:  20).  During 1998  Kabila  managed  to  rally  support  from  Angola,  Zimbabwe,  Chad  and Namibia  thus  making  the  conflict  truly  inter‐regional  and  fully  earning  the epithet “Africa’s first World War”. During  this  period  information  of  atrocities  committed  against  the  civilian populations began to surface. Human rights organizations were prevented from evacuating  people  from  the  refugee  camps  and  relief  workers  and  local eyewitnesses  told  of  mass  graves  in  the  jungle.  The  Tutsi  soldiers  of  the Rwandan  army  that  had  backed  the  ADFL  were  accused  of  committing  the atrocities and the UN launched an investigation but investigators were kept form travelling  to  the  region.  This  spurred  threats  of  sanctions  from  Western countries  and  the  UN.  In  1999  the  Lusaka  Ceasefire  Agreement  became  the starting point  for  the UN peace operation  in  the DRC; Mission de  l’Organisation 
des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo  (MONUC) (Norell et al. 2008: 20). However, the Lusaka agreement did not have a clear impact on the desperate situation in the DRC, since the rebel groups remained outside the agreement and even though the rebels finally signed the agreement fighting continued. A peace accord was finally reached in 2002, after the murder of Laurent Kabila and  the  assumption  to power by his  son,  Joseph Kabila. The  Sun City,  Pretoria and Luanda peace accords provided  the demobilization of  the Congolese army, the  integration  of  its  rival  factions,  the  establishment  of  a  constitutional government, a referendum on a new constitution, democratic elections and the agreement  from  Rwanda  and  Uganda  to  withdraw  and  stop  supporting  their rebel groups in the DRC. The peace accords in 2002 also settled a power‐sharing mechanism between the five major parties that gave Kabila the presidency with four  vice  presidents  appointed,  one  from  each  political‐military  force  in  the conflict. As the Rwandan and Ugandan troops began to withdraw fighting again began  in  the  eastern  Ituri  province.  MONUC  forces  were  unable  to  provide security  and  after  an  appeal  by  the  UN  Secretary‐General  Kofi  Annan  the  EU launched Operation Artemis with the objective to relieve the MONUC forces and 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stabilize  the  situation  in  the  region  (Dobbins  et  al  2008:  102,  128;  Ekengard 2009: 17‐18, 29).  
4.1.1 The situation in the DRC at the time of the interventions After  several  years  of  civil  and  regional war,  a  history  of  bad  governance,  low levels of economic and social development and an estimated 4 million dead the situation  in  the  DRC  was  critical.  The  legacy  of  Mobutu,  who  had  looted  the treasury, left the Zairian/Congolese state crippled.  The  security  situation  in  the  DRC  was  at  the  beginning  of  this  millennium disastrous.  Kabila’s  inability  to  hinder  the  attacks  on  Rwanda  from  Congolese territory  threatened  to  provoke  another  invasion  from  both  Rwanda  and Uganda.  Furthermore,  there was  a  vast  spectrum of  different militias who had not laid down their weapons after the peace accords in 2002 with frequent splits among  them  over  whether  to  continue  the  civil  war.  Neither  did  the  Kabila regime have the instruments to respond to the perilous situation. The police and the military were unable  to protect  the  country  and  the  citizens  from external and internal threats after the state failed to pay the salaries of the personnel and provide  them  with  proper  equipment.  Instead  they  frequently  harassed  and terrorized  the  population  in  order  to  get  food  and  supplies.  The  security situation  in the DRC was that of a Hobbesian nightmare. A society riddled with crime with a state unable to provide security for its citizens despite the fact that a peace accord was in effect and that the fighting had been temporarily stopped (Dobbins et al. 2008: 105‐106).  Adding  to  the  desperate  situation  was  a  humanitarian  crisis  of  biblical proportions  in  the  region.  Years  of  civil  war  and  incompetent  and  corrupt governance had  left  the people  impoverished. The different militias,  as well  as the government  forces,  indiscriminately killed,  raped and  tortured  the citizens. There  were  several  reports  of  mass  murder  and  the  use  of  child  soldiers  or children as servants or slaves to the different fractions. In 2003 the UN reported an estimated 2,7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Emergency relief in the area needed extensive funding and coordination but was also dependent of an  improvement  of  the  security  situation  for  the  relief workers. Moreover,  the 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humanitarian aid was additionally compromised by the poor infrastructure and medical facilities (ibid: 107). The challenge for the interim government of Kabila and later for the UN and EU was  the  formation  of  a  legitimate  and  functioning  government.  Since  the international political will for a major peace‐enforcing mission was lacking at the time,  the  only  option  to  stop  the  fighting  was  a  consensus  approach.  The possibility of eventual election and thus a division of power between the relevant actors  seemed  the  only  solution  to  stop  the  civil  war.  However,  there  were substantial obstacles to a formation of a constitutional government. The people of  the DRC had no experience with a  functioning  liberal democracy, or  for  that matter a state whose purpose is to serve the people, not the rulers. The decades of  dictatorship  had  left  the  state with  little  or  no  legitimacy  and  an  economic system that was quickly spiralling out of control. The political parties were often closely related to the criminal gangs or militias plaguing the country. Neither did there exist a common identity to which the citizens could relate. During the civil war  the Zairian  identity,  that was a product of  the Mobuto regime, had quickly disintegrated into a tribal or ethnical allegiances.  In addition to these obstacles the  sheer  size  of  the  country  and  the  poor  status  of  the  infrastructure  made essential  elections  necessities  as  a  census  and  voter  registration  a  sizable problem (Ekengard 2009: 27, Dobbins et al. 2008: 108).  
4.2 Construction The dilemma for a researcher devoted to analyse the discursive nature of the EU is that several important sources of information, such as the council groups are unavailable for analysis. For this thesis the focus thus lays at official documents concerning  the  subject  at hand. The EU  construction of  the  conflict  in  the DRC comprises  two  categories  of  essential  documents.  The  first  category  describes the EU view on the new security situation – both globally and locally – and the interconnectedness  between  the  European  security  situation  and  regional conflict outside the EU. The second category of documents explicitly declares the interdependence  between  the  EU  and  Africa  on  a  variety  of  subjects,  such  as trade, development; regional conflict; peace building and peace intervention. 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4.2.1 The view on security The view on security of  the European Union has since the end of  the Cold War changed dramatically. From being focused on static threats like invasion of other sovereign  nations  the  new  view  on  security  emphasizes  new  dynamic  threats that  require  a new security  strategy. Relevant  for  this  analysis  is  above  all  the European  Security  Strategy  (ESS)  of  December  2003,  revised  in  December  of 2008.  The  ESS  outlines  the  EU’s  subjective  interpretation  of  the  new  security environment,  the  strategic  objectives  of  the  EU  and  policy  implications  for Europe.  The  image  of  the  new  security  environment  that  the  ESS  presents  is  one  of interconnected needs and obligations. The need of the EU to control the security situation  goes  hand  in  hand with  the  need  of  development  in  other  countries. EU’s obligation to protect its interests and borders is connected to its obligation to  assist  other  countries  and  peoples  in  democratization,  state  building  and human  rights.  Security  is  a  necessity  for  development  and  development  is  a necessity  for  security.  From  a  state‐centric  past  we  now  live  in  a  borderless global community, which brings countries together when facing security issues. This has also empowered non‐state actors in international affairs, which in turn also  have  “increased  the  European  dependence  –  and  so  vulnerability  –  to external actors”. Within the EU, countries now “deal peacefully with disputes and are  cooperating  through  common  institutions”  but  the  dependence  on,  for example,  external  sources  of  energy  makes  it  impossible  for  the  EU  to  look inward  for  security  (ESS  2003:  1‐2).  The  document  further  denotes  the cooperation  between  the  U.S.  and  the  EU  as  one  of  the  crucial  elements  in resolving  international disputes, but  remarks  that no  country  is  able  to handle the  complex  problems  of  today’s world  alone.  The  size  and  importance  of  the EU’s political and economical sectors compels it to act like the global actor it is.  The impossibility for the EU to ignore the situation outside its borders is, in the document,  enhanced by  the  interpretation of  several  low‐intensity  threats  that together could pose a serious predicament for the EU. Threats like terrorism and 
  22 





The Cotonou Agreement is one of many documents and agreements declaring the  connection  between  the  EU  and  Africa  and  the  nature  of  that  connection. However, the Cotonou Agreement has special importance for this analysis seeing as  it  forms  a  fundamental  framework  for  African‐EU  relations  from  2000  to 2020,  including  a  political  dialogue  dimension  regarding  issues  like  peace building  and  conflict  prevention  (Elowson  2009:  16).  The  document  declares that  “broadly  based  policies  to  promote  peace  and  to  prevent,  manage  and resolve  violent  conflicts  shall  play  a  prominent  role  in  this  dialogue”  (Cotonou Agreement 2000: Art 8 § 5). It also ensures that   “in situations of violent conflict the Parties shall take all suitable action to prevent an intensification of violence, limit  its  territorial  spread,  and  to  facilitate  a  peaceful  settlement  of  existing disputes” (ibid: Art 11 § 4). The Cotonou agreement was an important milestone in  the  EU‐Afrcan  relations  but  it  was  above  all  a  cornerstone  in  the  EU construction of the issues in Africa as strategically important to the EU.   Having  dedicated  the  EU  to  a  partnership  with  the  African  countries  the  EU 
Strategy for Africa further outlines the EU construction of the particular situation in  different  parts  of  Africa  and  how  it  relates  to  the  EU.  The  EU  Strategy  for Africa, adopted in December of 2005, gave the EU a widespread, and long‐term policy  framework  that  reflects  the  priorities  in  its  relationship with  the whole African  continent.  Following  the  view  on  security  outlined  in  the  ESS,  the  EU Strategy  for  Africa  identifies  the  priorities  in  peace  and  security  issues.  The strategy is built around three themes, one of which largely focuses on peace and security3. The theme elaborates on following issues: Conflict Prevention (The use of  regional  and  national  policies  to  address  structural  causes  of  conflict,  the creation  of  an  Early  Warning  System,  the  increase  of  support  to  efforts  to strengthen governance/institutional capacity), Common Security Threats (WMDs, terrorism,  illegal  arms  exports  –  issues  that  undermines  regional  security), 
African Peace Support (Supporting African led peace operations and setting up a comprehensive  EU  approach  complementing  the  regional  instruments  with                                                         3 The themes are i) Prerequisites for attaining the Millennium Development Goals (peace and security and good governance), ii) Areas that create the economic environment for achieving the MDGs (economic growth, trade and interconnection) and iii) Areas directly targeting the MDGs (social cohesion and environment). (The EU Strategy for Africa 2005: 25: 3.1) 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CFSP/ESDP  approaches),  Disarmament  to  break  the  conflict  cycle  (Supporting regional DDRR operations4 and preventing proliferation of small arms and light weapons,  define  a  EU  approach  to  the  problem  drawing  from  first  pillar  and CFSP  instrument)5,  Post­conflict  situations  (Developing  a  more  coherent  and smooth  transition  from  short‐term  (humanitarian  assistance)  to  long‐term (development)  strategies  in  post‐conflict  situations  and  supporting  SSR missions),  Conflict  Resources  (Preventing  that  resource  extraction  becomes  a source  of  conflict  or  maintains  conflict)  (EU  Strategy  for  Africa  2005:  21‐23, Elowson 2009: 18). The EU strategy for Africa identifies the DRC, and the Great Lakes Region, as a state  characterized  by  structural  instability  in  a  region  dominated  by  a  “large number  of  countries  in  conflict  as  well  as  a  high  number  of  fragile  states,  i.e. states that – often weakened by endemic crises and conflicts or natural disasters – lack credible, legitimate and/or effective governance”.  The  DRC  is  placed  in  a line  of  insecurity  that  “can  be  traced  form  the  Sudan  and  the  Horn  of  Africa, across  the Central African Republic  and northern Uganda  to  eastern DRC”  (EU Strategy for Africa 2005: 11). One of the reasons for the persistence of insecurity and a major concern for the EU is, according to the document, the connection between organized crime and conflict. The African continent has become an international hub for smuggling of drugs,  arms  and  natural  resources.  The  majority  of  the  African  countries  are affected  by  international  human  trafficking,  either  as  a  source,  transit  or destination  country. These  sectors nourish each other and prosper  thanks  to a situation of insecurity and the absence of a functioning state. Together with the fact that the Great Lakes Region is resource rich, and the DRC in particular due to its  Coltan  deposits6,  there  are  several  incentives  for  non‐state  actors  to  try  to maintain the current situation to serve their own economic interests (Ekengard 2009:  46).  This  in  turns  hinders  development,  fuels  extremism  and  creates  a 
                                                        4 Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Reinsertion 5 Here the document explicitly states that drawing from experiences in the DRC would be advantageous in the creation of a new approach. 6 Coltan is a common name for the mineral colobit‐tantalit which is an important part of computers, cellular phones etc. The DRC produces 80 % of the worlds supply of Coltan (Swedish National Encyclopedia; http://www.ne.se.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/sok/coltan?type=NE) 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variety of  possible  threats  to  the EU. A more  stabile  region  in,  and around  the heart of Africa is therefore a prioritized objective for the EU. 
4.3 Governance There were two major actors intervening in the conflict in the DRC. The EU and the UN. The focus here will be the EU but since the two organizations are closely interconnected a very brief introduction of the UN effort is in place.  The  MONUC  intervention  started  in  1999  and  has  during  the  last  decade undergone  significant  change  and  growth.  In  the  wake  of  the  2002  Pretoria accords the size of the intervention force was around 4000 soldiers and military observers. The initial objective of MONUC was to provide military observers for the  peace  accords  but  was  by  2002  expanded  to  include  Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Resettlement and Repatriation (DDRRR) In 2003 when security deteriorated the Security Council increased the number of troops to 10.800 and provided MONUC with a Chapter VII mandate7. During 2006  the MONUC was tasked with the organization and protection of the national election. In 2008  the  focus of MONUC had changed, as  its primary objective became  the protection  of  civilians.  In  2009  it  was  the  largest  and  most  expensive  active peace operation of the UN (Ekengard 2009: 19‐21). 
4.3.1 The EU intervention The EU has been  involved  in  the peace process  in  the DRC since 1996.  Initially only  with  political  and  diplomatic  relations  through  the  EU  Special Representative  (EUSR)  to  the  Great  Lakes  Region  and  later with  both military peace  enforcing  operations  and  civil  peace  keeping  operations.  The  EUSR functions as the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council’s (EU GAERC) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy’s    (CFSP) extension  in the region. The  purpose  of  the  EUSR  is  to  contribute  to  the  solution  of  tensions  between actors  involved  in  the  conflict,  to  facilitate  international  initiatives  and negotiations  and  to  coordinate  humanitarian  efforts  from  the  European Commission with the CFSP missions of the European Council.  
                                                        7 Chapter VII of the UN chart allows the UNSC to authorize the use of the armed forces of a member state to ”maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 42, Chapter VII, United Nations Charter; http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml). 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The  EU  has  through  the  first  and  second  pillar  (Community  Action  and  the CFSP)8  sent  two  military  missions  (Artemis  and  EUFOR  RDC)  and  two  civil Security  Sector  Reform  (SSR)  missions  (EUPOL  and  EUSEC)  (Hoebeke  et  al. 2007:3). 
4.3.2 Operation Artemis In 2003 the security situation deteriorated in the eastern parts of the DRC, in the Ituri province. The MONUC forces in the town of Bunia had neither the resources nor the mandate to handle the situation and its capability to protect civilians and monitor  the  humanitarian  situation  quickly  diminished.  The  UN  Secretary‐General  Kofi  Annan  sent  an  official  letter  to  the  UN  Security  Council  (UNSC) requesting  an  interim  emergency multinational  force  (IEMF).  UNSC Resolution 1484  made  it  possible  to  launch  an  operation  to  the  area  to  stabilize  the situation,  contribute  to  humanitarian  relief,  help  protect  the  Bunia  camps, protect  the  civilian  population  and  secure  the  airport  (Ekengaard  2009:  28, Hoebeke et al. 2009: 8). The  EU  was  finally  asked  by  UNSG  Kofi  Annan  to  aid  MONUC  and  France reported  its willingness to  lead the operation under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). On June 5th 2003 the Council of the EU designated France as  framework  nation  for  operation  Artemis,  which  allows  the  EU  to  use  the command‐and‐control  facilities  of  a  member  state.  In  respect  to  Artemis  this meant  that  was  to  be  run  from  the  French  headquarters  in  Paris  but  remain under  the political  control of  the Council of  the European Union’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels. This meant that the council had authority of  the  operational  plan,  the  rules  of  engagement  and  chain‐of‐command decisions (Dobbins et al. 2008: 111). The EU operation, which had the same mandate as the UNSC Resolution 1484, was  launched on  June 12th.  The  forces deployed  to Bunia  included 230 French and  Swedish  Special  Forces  operatives  and  around  1000  conventional  French troops supported by officers and troops from Belgium, Canada, South Africa and the UK. The primary task of the IEMF forces was to halt the violence in Bunia. At the time of arrival the fragile cease‐fire was being broken by at least six different                                                         8 Since the EU involvement in the DRC predates the Lisbon treaty the author has chosen to maintain the old description of EU institutional structure. 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fighting  fractions trying to take over the control of  the town from the Rwanda‐backed Union of Congolese Patriots militia. On  June 22nd  the  IEMF commander declared  that  Bunia  and  a  ten‐kilometre  radius  around  the  town  would  be  a weapon‐free zone. The IEMF forces conducted several operations to enforce the declaration  and  engaged  in  combat  with  armed  fractions  or  militias  on  some occasions.  Even  if  the  zone  never  became  the  weapon‐free  zone  that  was intended at  least weapons were no  longer openly brandished. A  few days  later civilians  started  to  return  to  the  town  and  the  competing  fractions  opened political  offices,  seemingly  supporting  the  peace  process  (ibid:  117‐118, Ekengard 2009: 29, Hadden 2009: 11). 
4.3.3 Operation EUPOL Kinshasa – EUPOL RD Congo One  of  the  peace  accords  mentioned  earlier  –  the  Pretoria  Accord  of  2002  – opened  the  possibility  for  the  creation  of  a  specialized  unit  of  the  Police 
Nationale Congolaise: the Unité de Police Intégrée (UPI). The purpose of the new police  unit  was  to  “ensure  the  protection  of  the  transition  institutions  and  to reinforce the internal security apparatus” (Hoebeke et al. 2007: 9). The  EU  agreed  to  support  the  project  and  the  subsequent  project  plan consisted of three stages. The first and the second stage was the responsibility of the  EU  Commission  and  had  a  purely  financial  character.  The  third  stage involved  the EU Council  and  implicated an ESDP SSR mission  to  the Congolese capital  of  Kinshasa.  The  mission,  that  was  launched  in  February  2005,  at  the same  time  as  the  deployment  phase  of  the  UPI,  had  a  mandate  to  “monitor, mentor  and  advise  the  setting  up  and  initial  running  of  the  Congo  Police” (Hadden 2009: 13).  The  EUPOL  mission  consisted  initially  of  29  international  staff  and  police officers  from  European  nations  and  two  non‐European  nations:  Canada  and Turkey. Until June 2005 the EUPOL staff’s primary function was to participate in the  training of UPI  officers.  Since  July 2005  the EUPOL also participates  in  the census and registration of the members of the Congolese National Police. During the  election  period  of  2006  the  EUPOL  made  a  joint  effort  with  the  EUSEC mission to provide and ensure a competent and coordinated police response in the case of disturbances in Kinshasa (Hoebeke et al. 2007: 10). 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Since July 2007 EUPOL Kinshasa became EUPOL Congo. The change entailed an enlargement  of  the  engagement  to  nation‐level  and  an  increase  in  experts contributing  to  the mission. The objective of  the mission now also  includes  the integration of a reformed justice system and the coordination with the national police force (EU Council press release 2009‐08: 6). 
4.3.4 Operation EUSEC RDC EUSEC  RDC  was  the  other  Security  Sector  Reform  (SSR)  mission  to  the  DRC launched  in  May  2005.  It  was  a  small  mission  with  the  objective  to  provide advice and support to the Congolese army (FARDC) and the reintegration of ex‐combatants into the army. The EUSEC staff were deployed within the FARDC and provided support on all administrative  levels. A second objective was added to the  mission  later  the  same  year.  This  was  to  resolve  the  problem  with  the misappropriation  of  funds  and  the  appearance  of  “ghost  soldiers”  i.e.  non‐existent persons who were used to cash out fake salaries. In practice this had to be  done  by  separating  the  payment  chain  from  the  command  chain.  Another problem was the fact that soldiers in fact did not get paid, which instigated them to live of the population and promoted corruption (ibid: 11, Dobbins et al. 2008: 122). 
4.3.5 Operation EUFOR RD Congo The  election  process  during  the  summer  of  2006  the  UN  saw  the  need  for  a reinforcing mission  to ensure security during  the election. After a new request from  the  UN  to  the  EU,  the  EUFOR RD  Congo was  launched  in  June  2006  and consisted  of  forces  from  France,  Germany,  eighteen  other  European  countries and Turkey. EUFOR RD Congo was a military mission organized under the CFSP and  included  an  advance  force  based  in  Kinshasa,  a  reserve  force  stationed  in Gabon and secondary reserve force based in Europe. The UNSC Resolution 1671 mandate of EUFOR RD Congo was  similar  to  that of Artemis but  the  force was only  to  engage  if MONUC was  “facing  difficulties  fulfilling  its  own mandate;  to protect civilians under imminent threat  in the area were EUFOR was deployed; protect  the  airport;  protect  own  personnel,  installations  and  freedom  of movement;  and  conduct  limited  operations  to  extract  individuals  in  danger” (Ekengard 2009: 31). 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During the electoral period the EUFOR had to  intervene  in Kinshasa together with MONUC when supporters from the two major candidates Bemba and Kabila clashed in late August of 2006. These clashes were a critical threat to the peace process and the elections since the Bemba and Kabila were to face each other in the second round of elections (Hoebeke et al. 2007: 12). 
4.3.6 The link between construction and governance The questions  regarding  the EU  security  governance of  the  intervention  in  the DRC are primarily concerned with how the EU links the form of the intervention to the current phase of the conflict. In the light of the restricted insight in the EU Council  Committees  and  working  groups,  the  analysis  has  to  be  based  on  the official  papers  and  declarations made  regarding  the  intervention. However,  by scrutinizing  the Council  Joint Action  (CJA) declarations  and press  releases  it  is possible  to  obtain  an  image  of  how  the  Council  linked  the  intervention  to  the current phase of the conflict. When  operation Artemis was  lunched  there  existed  an  imminent  threat  of  a similar humanitarian disaster as in Rwanda a decade earlier. As discussed above, the UN request for assistance to its mission and the UNSC Resolution 1484, both made  it  perfectly  clear  that  the  situation  in  the  Ituri  province  was  most precarious (UNSC Resolution 14849).  On the 4th of  June 2003 EUSR Javier Solana gave a briefing  in a press release outlining  the preparations  for  operation Artemis  and  the Councils  view on  the conflict. The press release states that “the situation in the Ituri region constitutes a threat to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo and to peace and security in the wider Great Lakes region. The EU is particularly concerned by the atrocities perpetrated  in  that region”. Furthermore,  it  stresses  that  “we are facing a humanitarian crisis. Therefore time is of the essence. ” (EU Council press release S0123/03: 2003/06/0410).  The press release clearly shows the perceived  importance and small window of  opportunity  where  an  intervention  could  succeed  in  avoiding  another genocide  and  its  connection  to  the  regional  security  situation.  Put  in  relation with  the  Cotonou  Agreement  analysed  earlier,  the  motives  behind  the                                                         9 http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html  10 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=606&lang=sv 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intervention  are  clear.  They  correspond  to  the  explicit  objectives  of  the  EU’s humanitarian and regional policies as well as the Council Joint Action controlling the intervention. In  terms  of  how  the  EU  linked  the  intervention  instrument  to  the  perceived conflict phase there are two indicative aspects in the official document. First, the situation was of such magnitude that a swift intervention was needed. Secondly, the MONUC military  forces already at  the  location were not  able  to handle  the situation,  which  called  for  a  military  operation  in  order  to  relieve  them  (CJA 2003/423/CFSP, CJA 2006/412/CFSP, CJA 2007/147/CFSP). The  implemented  intervention  instrument,  operation  Artemis,  was  in  all aspects such a swift military operation. After having reduced the time to come to a decision the operation was launched in less than a month from the moment the request  from  the  UNSG  came  (Ekengard  2009:  31).  Additionally,  the  superior strength of the intervention force ensured that, in spite of eventual hostilities in the  intervention  zone, mission  failure was highly unlikely.  Troops were drawn from  special  forces  or  paratroops  regiments,  equipped  with  heavy  weaponry including attack aircraft, attack helicopters, light tanks and armoured personnel carriers. However, the EU force did not only rely on superior strength to succeed with the mission objectives.  Dobbins et al. identify the combination of superior force,  readiness  to  use  the  force  and  pressure  on  local  leadership  as  main reasons for the success of the mission (Dobbins 2008: 119). Others, like Thomas Turner,  analyses  the  intervention  from  another  perspective.  He  interprets  the intervention as yet another example of French ambition “to practice geopolitics in the region behind a screen of humanitarianism” (Turner 2007: 159). Leaving different  interpretations  aside,  the  mission  should  be  recognized  for,  at  least temporarily, improving the security situation in the area. When the security situation  improved the EU deescalated the  intervention to the  level  of  the  subsequent  civil  EUPOL  and  EUSEC  missions.  These  missions continue to this date but were reinforced when, as previously discussed, security deteriorated during  the electoral process. The difference  in  intensity of  the EU operations show that the EU is, at least on a macro‐level, a coherent peace actor and have the capability to effectively link its instruments to the current phase of the conflict (Dobbins et al. 2008: 122‐125). 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Nonetheless,  the  governance  of  the  intervention  in  the DRC has  not  gone  by without  criticism.    The EU was  criticized  for  not  coordinating  the military  and civil CFSP mission to the humanitarian missions conducted, or supported, by the European  Commission.  The  lack  of  internal  coordination  between  the  Council and the Commission was also mirrored by an insufficient external coordination with the UN. In the case of Artemis the Council, suspecting MONUC of intelligence leaks, did not inform the MONUC leadership that the IEMF was to be deployed to the  DRC  until  the  first  Special  Forces  elements  already  were  in  place. Furthermore,  the  intervention  has  been  accused  of  operational  rigidness  since Brussels demanded political control over tactical decisions, which prolonged the decision‐making  process.  For  the  EU  the  chain  of  command  was  Brussels‐Operational Headquarters‐DRC11 in comparison with the UN where the MONUC forces stood in direct contact with New York (Ekengard 2009: 31).  
4.4 Impact The nature of politics and conflicts is seldom black or white;  it  is more often in different  scales  of  gray.  So  is  the  case  of  the  impact  of  the  intervention  in  the DRC.  Worth  remembering  here  is  the  distinction  made  above  between intervention and operation. The intervention is defined as the total peace effort of the EU; i.e. the sum of all the different operations.  Generally,  there  are  two  ‘versions’  of  the  impact  in  the  DRC.  Depending  on which perspective that is employed – long‐term or short‐term – the conclusions typically  differ.  From  an  operational  point  of  view,  all  of  the  EU  operations fulfilled their mandates and reached the objectives, but from a development and humanitarian  perspective  the  situation  in  the  DRC  is  still  so  critical  that  the actual  success  of  the  intervention  may  be  contested.  However,  one  should commend  the  intervention  forces  for  the  success  in  hindering  a  further escalation of  the conflict  into a new regional war. Although there still  is a poor security situation and a humanitarian crisis in the country, the situation is now substantially better than before the intervention (Dobbins et al. 2008: 116). 
                                                        11 The Operational Headquarters for Artemis was in Paris while for EUFOR it was in Potsdam. 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4.4.1 The military operations Starting  with  the  Artemis  operation  in  2003  the  EU  managed  to  improve, although  not  consistently,  the  security  situation  in  the  eastern  regions  of  the country. The country is not in a phase of open war but there are still a number of armed fractions active in the eastern and northeastern parts of the country and outbursts of violence are common (US State Department January 201012).  When Artemis gave over the control of the region fighting had stopped and the civilian population could freely move within the controlled area.  One regrettable unintended consequence was that when the IEMF pushed the armed militias out of Bunia it  intensified the fighting in the surrounding area. In mid‐2004 a crisis broke out in the Kivu province, just south of the area were the Artemis force was deployed. A rebel fraction took control of several towns in the province, several hundred  people  were  killed  and  thousands  displaced.  After  considerable international pressure and support  from MONUC the Congolese army managed to take back the control of the towns and disarm some parts of the rebel forces (Dobbins et al. 2008: 120).  The  importance of Artemis was that  it supported the peace process at a time when it was as most sensible. Since the Transition was  launched on the 30th of June  2003  the  timing  of  the  operation was  essential.  If,  the  Artemis  operation had  not  taken  place  it  is  doubtful  if  the  Transition  process  would  ever  had started and, even if so, even more doubtful that the Congolese army would have been able to handle the crisis a year later (Turner 2007: 165).  Furthermore,  the  operation  gave MONUC  the  crucial  time  to  reassemble  and augment its capacity on the ground and maintain the credibility of the UN as an actor  in  the  peace  process.  In  the  light  of  the  failure  of  the  UN  mission  to neighbouring Rwanda half a decade earlier, and the fact that many of the armed fractions  came  from  that  side  of  the  border,  another  UN  failure  to  protect civilians in the same region would have been devastating for the UN activities in the Great Lakes Region  (Hoebeke et al. 2007: 8). Operation Artemis was never intended to be a long‐term mission, only to secure the area until MONUC forces were able to reassume command again, and was in this perspective a success. 
                                                        12 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm#political 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The  impact  of  the  second  military  mission,  EUFOR  RD  Congo,  was  that  it successfully  separated  the  forces  of  president  Kabila  and  senator  Bemba  (also opposition candidate) during the elections. EUFOR rescued a group of diplomats that were trapped in Bemba’s cellar when Kabila’s forces attacked. The incidence augmented  the  legitimacy of  the EU  forces since  it was directed against Kabila. This discouraged the view that  the EUFOR simply was  there  to ensure  that  the candidate  favourite  to  the  EU was  installed  as  president  (Dobbins  et  al.  2008: 125).  The  EUFOR  also  guaranteed  that  MONUC  had  assistance  if  the  situation demanded it. 
4.4.2 The civilian operations The problem with  the  continuing  insecurity  in  the  area  is  in  part  due  to  the inability of the Congolese post‐election administration to rebuild the Congolese army,  thus  leaving  the  bulk  of  the  burden  for  establishing  and  preserving security  in  the  region  on  the  UN.  The  civil  EU  SSR  mission  EUSEC  in  2005 accomplished some progress regarding the issue of the Congolese administration not sufficiently handling the DDRR program. By September 2006 the World Bank reported  that 91.806 adult 27.346  child  combatants had been demobilized but there still remained some 50.000 combatants to be processed in 2007 (Dobbins et al. 121‐122). The success of demobilizing 125.000 combatants and the failure of the remaining 50.000 cannot be attributed solely to the EU. The UN, the World Bank  and  other  actors  had  both  great  influence  in  this  process,  as  well  as enormous  difficulties  to  coordinate  their  policies  and  methods  of implementation.  The  EUSEC  advisors  also  worked  with  various  representatives  of  the Congolese security administration and implemented the separation of the salary‐payment system from the chain of command. An accomplishment of  the EUSEC mission  is  to  have  occupied  strategic  positions  within  the  Congolese  security system  where  the  advisors  have  developed  crucial  contacts  with  local  key personnel. This has facilitated the transference of know‐how and maintained the confidence of the Congolese authorities (Hoebeke et al 2007: 11). 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The SSR missions, EUSEC and EUPOL Kinshasa/RD Congo, are subject to great discrepancies  between  evaluations  from,  on  one  side  political  and  strategic analysts and on the other humanitarian organizations. The missions  were  focused  on  establishing  and  training  a  competent  police force  in  Kinshasa  in  order  to  protect  the  transition  authorities  and  to  avoid clashes during the elections. The EU successfully funded a program and trained the UPI  consisting  of  roughly  1000  police  officers  by May  2005.  In  September 2005 all of the involved international actors had trained and deployed a total of 39.000  police  across  the  country.  These  forces,  especially  the  EU‐trained  UPI unit, have shown, according to some analysts, “calm and professionalism” in the disturbances  during  the  election  (Hoebeke  2007:  10,  Dobbins  2008:  123). However,  the  Swedish  International  Development  Agency  (SIDA)  reported  in two consecutive country reports, written by their staff at the Swedish embassy in Kinshasa,  that  “human  rights  abuses  are  characterized  by  arbitrary  arrests, unlawful  detentions,  lootings,  kidnappings,  torture,  rapes,  destruction  of property,  cannibalism, mutilation  and massacres.  The  abuses  affect mostly  the civil population and the situation is most severe in the east of the country. Most 
violations are performed by the security forces. Much of the human rights abuses are  linked to  illegal mineral extraction  in the eastern parts of DRC.” (SIDA DRC Country  Report  2006:  7,  emphasis  by  the  author).  In  2007  the  reports  states: “The national army and police have not been capable of bringing security to the population.  The  weak  capacity  of  the  national  security  forces  is  part  of  the security  problem  in  eastern  DRC.  Insecurity  has  lead  to  increased  numbers  of IDPs and one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.” (SIDA DRC Country Report 2007: 4). The Swedish Foreign Ministry concurs in this description of the situation  and  stress  the  “flagrant  HR‐violations  during  2007  through  the excessive force used by the police during demonstrations in the province of Bas‐Congo  and  the  national  security  forces  battle with  Jean‐Pierre  Bembas  private forces (senator and opposition candidate) in the centre of the capital” (Swedish Foreign Ministry 2007: 1). On both occasions hundreds civilians were injured or killed.  These  reports  are,  regardless  of  which  perspective  one  employs  as  a researcher,  extremely  compromising  for  the  EU  SSR  missions  and  shows  a radically different picture regarding the success of the missions. 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A  fact,  which  slightly  discredits  the  political,13  and  the  strategic14  analyst’s conclusions is that they were not actually in the conflict zone at the time of the events,  opposed  to  the  SIDA  staff  and  the  Swedish  diplomats  who  worked  in Kinshasa during the time in question.  
5. Summary and conclusions This thesis has shown how the theories of securitization and security governance can  explain  how  the  EU  forms  its  perception  of  a  conflict.  Furthermore,  it  has demonstrated  the  significance  of  external  regional  conflicts  to  the  internal security of the EU.   The  construction  dimension  demonstrated  how  intrastate  conflict  in  the modern era has increasingly become an international matter. The modern global community  consists  of  states  that  are  brought  together  when  facing  security issues. The EU has through a web of political agreements, economic interest and the  transformed  security  issues  shaped  its  general  perception  of  the  situation and conflict in the DRC and the obligations of the EU. This perception varied over the course of time but the EU was mainly concerned with the implosion of state institutions and the lack of human security. The analysis has also shown that the security of  the EU is connected to the development  in other countries, where a decline  in  the  security  situation  could  indirectly  pose  a  threat  to  the  EU.  The deterioration of security in the DRC in 2003 was both a threat to the transition process  in  the DRC and  to  the  fragile peace  in  the Great Lakes  region. A  failed peace  process  and  the  possibility  of  another  failed  state  in  a  already  troubled region  could  have  signified  a  serious  threat  to  the  EU.  Moreover,  the international community was committed to avoid another genocide like the one in Rwanda in 1994‐95.  The  analysis  of  the  EU  governance  of  the  intervention  showed  that  the  EU adequately links the form of intervention to the current phase of the conflict. In periods of  increased  insecurity  in  the area, or significant  threat  to MONUC,  the EU did not hesitate to deploy full‐strength military force to pacify the situation.                                                         13 The Belgian think tank Centre d’Analyse Statégique 14 The US think tank The Rand Cooperation 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In  other  periods  the  EU  involvement  changed  to  focus  on  reconstructing  the institutions  and  security  apparatus  of  the  Congolese  state15.  However,  the  EU governance was  not  flawless.  There were  problems with  internal  coordination between the Council and the Commission, which hindered an optimal use of the humanitarian  aid  active  in  the  area  and  an  overabundant  demand  of  political control in the chain of command from Brussels caused operational rigidness.  The analysis of the impact of the intervention has shown that some progress in the humanitarian situation has been made and that the national administration has improved. The EU intervention has had a positive effect on the development in the DRC even though there still is lot to be done.  More  importantly  the  analysis  has  shown  the  difference  between  civil  and military  operations.  The  military  operations  have  been  shown  to  quickly  and effectively improve the security and humanitarian situation when the weak local institutions  did  not  have  the  capacity  to  protect  the  citizens.  When  the  EU retreated the local forces were not able to maintain the level of security and the humanitarian situation once again deteriorated. The widespread corruption, lack of a functioning legal system and dissolution within the security forces has given impunity  to  criminals,  assassins,  rapists  and warlords. Additionally,  there have been  several  reports  of  security  forces  actually  being  the  perpetrators  of atrocities against  the civilian population. Regretfully,  the high credibility of  the reports brings this thesis to conclude that the civil operations  in the DRC have, with some exceptions, been a failure. The EU successfully trained and equipped thousands  of  police  officers  and  reintegrated many more  soldiers,  but  if  those agents of the state do not uphold law and order and protect the citizens of what use are they then?   This thesis contends that the motives for the EU to intervene in regional conflict to a large part are related to the change in the security milieu since the cold war.                                                         15  What  has  not  been  addressed  here  is  the  concern  raised  by  some  analysts  that  the intervention,  especially  Artemis,  was  just  a  way  for  the  EU  to  prove  itself  capable  of  military intervention without the help of the US and NATO. One event supporting this opinion is when the foreign ministers of Belgium and France prized the operation as a major success during a  joint visit to Bunia. The ministers emphasized the success that the operation represented for the ESDP rather than the importance for the state‐building in the DRC (Dobbins et al. 2008: 119, 136). 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